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The Hour of the Regions: An Analysis of 
the State of Governance in the European 
Union
Shaniqua L. Singleton
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Abstract
As the European Union (EU) has expanded and delved into new policy areas, the need 
for cooperation among local, national, and supranational actors has become evident. Scholars 
have characterized this new wave of EU and regional cooperation as multilevel governance. 
However, the exact role of regional entities remains a hotly contested issue. This paper ana-
lyzes the current state of regional government participation in the EU. I argue that despite its 
initial fame in the late nineties, multilevel governance is not a viable description of the type 
of governance seen in today’s EU. Instead, I show that governance in the EU most closely 
resembles a combination of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism.
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multilevel governance, regionalism, and integration
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The European Union (EU), in its ever increasing supranational sense, has wrested some 
power away from the national governments to its institutions. Almost simultaneously, the EU 
has worked to forge partnerships with regional and local governments across Europe. The 
apparent interest in promoting cooperation between the EU and regional entities has been 
heralded by scholars as signifying the hour of the regions. Hooghe and Marks, two of the 
most insightful scholars on regionalism in Europe, argue that power in the EU is now shared 
among various territorial levels instead of being concentrated within one group. Others have 
been skeptical of Hooghe and Marks’ argument, stating that overall power in the EU still rests 
with the nation states. Given these two sides of the debate, the question has become who 
is correct. Has the EU moved towards a system of governance in which the regions have a 
more viable role in policy-making? That is to say, can the current system of governance in 
the EU be described as multilevel governance? Or are liberal intergovernmentalists correct 
in arguing that decision-making power in the institutions still rests with the nation-states? 
This thesis does not take a side on either of those points. In thinking about the ways the EU, 
member states and regions come together perhaps the best way to describe governance in 
this organization is a system that marries both multilevel governance and liberal intergov-
ernmentalism. 
Regionalism in the EU is a fairly recent phenomenon, one that has completely shaken 
up the existing power structure of the supranational body. Prior to 1985, the idea of regional 
involvement in the EU seemed outlandish. While the member states were anxious to reduce 
regional disparities, as evident by the preamble to the Treaty of Rome1, they were not yet 
ready to allow regional entities to have a say in the decision making process (Allen, 2000). 
In order to bring the goal of reducing regional disparities to fruition, the idea of “cohesion” 
was written into the Single European Act of 1985. Cohesion was to be achieved by giving 
European Investment Bank loans to needy regions, coordinating member states’ economic 
policies, and promoting common Community guidelines. To fund this effort the member 
states agreed to a large financing package, named Delors-1, which would double the EU’s 
structural funds (Allen, 2000). Initially, the structural and cohesion funds were meant to as-
sist regions where Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, technology and development 
were falling behind the EU average. Over time the structural and cohesion funds have ex-
panded to include more regions and greater policy areas. Since 1988, the objectives of the 
funds have expanded to include regions that are affected by industrial decline, regions that 
require assistance in facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial change, regions com-
bating long term unemployment and regions working to modernize their employment and 
education systems (Allen, 2000). 
Due to the structural and cohesion funds, regional governments became important 
partners in the EU's policy implementation process (Jeffery, 2002). As these regional govern-
ments became even more involved in the implementation of EU policies, some called for 
a method through which they could regularly provide their input on EU guidelines. The 
Commission responded by creating its own body in 1988, named the Consultative Council 
of Regional and Local Authorities (Jeffery, 2002). The goal of this body was to promote a 
partnership between the Commission and regional authorities in the planning and decision-
1 The preamble to the Treaty of Rome states that an objective of the states was to, “strengthen the unity of their 
economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less-favored regions.”
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making of the structural funds (Allen, 2000). A few years later the Commission proposed that 
a body for regional and local governments be formalized into the treaties. When the Treaty 
of Maastricht was first discussed and later implemented in 1993, the Commission’s proposal 
was upheld. The Committee of Regions was created and had its inaugural meeting in 1994. 
The initial discourse surrounding how to end regional disparities among the member 
states and the formalization of regional participation marked the emergence of multilevel 
governance and liberal intergovernmentalism in the EU. In those early years, many viewed 
the structural and cohesion funds and creation of the Committee of Regions as a shift to-
wards regionalism. Due to intense lobbying by regional governments, there finally emerged 
an opportunity for the regions to have a voice among the member states and institutions 
of the EU. However, the very creation of structural and cohesion funds was due to intense 
inter-state bargaining (Allen, 2000). It was the member states who had to agree to the terms 
of Delors-1, and it was the member states who decided how these funds should be moni-
tored. It can be argued that both the member states and regions acted as the driving forces 
behind the creation of the structural and cohesion funds. As evident by the emergence of 
regionalism, the issue of governance in the EU is not so black and white. 
Since the emergence of regionalism, the EU itself was marked by both multilevel 
governance and liberal intergovernmentalist tendencies. It is important to understand what 
each of these arguments state. As previously mentioned, multilevel governance emerged in 
the 1990s with the work of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. Primarily Hooghe and Marks 
argue that, "Political areas are interconnected rather than nested." This means that while na-
tional arenas remain important venues for the formation of national government preferences, 
sub-national governments are no longer nested inside of them. Instead sub-national actors 
operate in both a national and supranational arena (Hooghe, 2000). Liberal intergovernmen-
talism, as seen in the work of Andrew Moravcsik, argues that states are the main actors in 
European integration; there is no room for sub-national actors to have a place in the decision 
making process. In an organization as large as the EU it is difficult to make such black and 
white generalizations about its trajectory or agenda. My thesis shows that the same is true for 
characterizing governance in the EU. 
Overall, this thesis explores the current state of relations between the EU and regional 
governments. With this information I show that governance in the EU is most accurately 
described as a fusion of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. The re-
mainder of my research sets out to demonstrate this marrying of liberal intergovernmental-
ism and multilevel governance using the Basque and Catalan regions as case studies. The 
following chapter explores the literature surrounding each of these theoretical frameworks, 
and relations between the EU and regions. Chapter three explores the results from my thesis, 
and chapter four will conclude my research with a look ahead at how the findings can be 
applied to other aspects of EU regional policy. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Following the expansion of the EU into greater policy areas and emergence of the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds demands for greater regional participation in the institutions 
mounted, specifically in those areas with entrenched regionalist movements like the Basque 
Country and Catalonia in Spain. Gradually these regional groups did gain some presence in 
the institutions and the EU entered a new phase of governance. However, traditional un-
derstandings of the integration process proved incapable of explaining this shift in control. 
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Although prior literature has pitted multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism 
against each other, the most accurate way of describing governance in the EU is as a mixture 
of these arguments. 
The process of regionalism in the EU and development towards a system that is a 
combination of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism can be thought of 
as having occurred in two time frames. The first came about in the late 1980s through 1995 
and was marked by initial movement towards regional involvement in the EU and euphoria 
over the ‘hour of the regions’. The second time frame began in 1996 and extends into the 
present. It has been characterized by greater exercising of influence by the regional govern-
ments, but also disappointment with the extent to which power has been devolved to the 
regions. This final time frame is the period during which governance in the EU emerged as 
a mixture of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. This is the subject of 
my results chapter. 
Late 1980s-1995: Initial Optimism and the Hour of the Regions
Much of the literature on regionalism in the EU focuses on the Committee of Re-
gions and regional offices, and does so with good reason. Perhaps the most visible example 
of multilevel governance and regionalism in the EU has been the creation of the Committee 
of Regions (CoR). Established in 1994, the CoR was meant to be a venue through which 
regional governments could formally participate in the policy-making process of the EU 
(Jeffery, 2002). Primarily, the Committee of Regions was able to exercise its influence on 
the EU by writing opinions on legislative issues (Illeborg). Furthermore, the members of 
the CoR would offer policy suggestions and ‘lobby’ EU officials to address issues that are of 
concern in their region. Though these opinions and policy suggestions are not legally bind-
ing, many members of the CoR viewed them as a means of bringing regional concerns to 
the European level (Jeffery, 2002). Proponents of multilevel governance viewed the creation 
of the Committee of Regions as proof that power in the EU was being shared across ter-
ritorial levels. 
The establishment of regional offices in close proximity to the EU institutions marked 
the second important development towards regionalism and serves as an example of multi-
level governance in this time period. In 1986, Spanish regional offices were opened in Brus-
sels (Magone, 2003). Not surprisingly, the Basque and Catalan regions were among the first 
Spanish regions to exercise this privilege and open offices. When regional offices were first 
established they were viewed as a means of directly linking the regions to the EU institu-
tions. Though the regional offices had no individual powers over the policy-making process 
they provided an opportunity for the regions to directly lobby EU representatives. However, 
the Spanish central government was not so keen upon sharing its influence with its regions. 
Following the creation of Basque and Catalan regional offices in Brussels, the central 
government cited a statue in the 1978 Spanish Constitution that explicitly barred the au-
tonomous communities from entering into any “international commitments” (Roller, 2004). 
As Roller mentions in her work on the topic, the government went even further by taking 
the issue to the Spanish Parliament and courts. On both of these occasions, the courts ruled 
against the government. In 1995, the courts upheld the right of the regions to establish of-
fices in Brussels (Roller, 2004; Bourne, 2008). For the regional governments and scholars 
working on the topic, the courts’ ruling in favor of the regions provided more evidence that 
the era of national governments suppressing the interactions of the regions with the EU was 
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ending. 
With the emergence of the Committee of Regions and regional offices, it is no wonder 
that the late 1980s and early years of the 1990s were thought of as the hour of the regions. 
During this time period, the regions gained a formal means of interacting with the EU de-
spite the fact that they were still under the auspices of their national government. Between 
the late 1980s and 1995, it appeared as if scholars supporting multilevel governance, namely 
Hooghe and Marks, were correct and that the regions were finally establishing themselves 
at the EU level. However, the subsequent time period (1995-present) demonstrated a move 
towards a more mixed system in which multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmen-
talism are both viable characterizations of governance in the EU. 
1995-Present: Exercising of Regional Influence and Disappointment
Given their new-found status at the European level, regional governments in the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and beyond sought to extend and exercise their influence as 
much as possible. However, within this time frame the member states also moved to reassert 
themselves vis-à-vis the growing presence of the regions in the EU. It is during this period 
that the nature of governance in the EU, a system which is a mix of liberal intergovernmen-
talism and multilevel governance, comes to light.
The expansion of the EU to include new member states and contend with more policy 
areas left scholars and EU officials wondering how the institutions would accommodate all 
of the recent changes. The EU Constitution was proposed to provide solutions to these is-
sues. Though it was meant to address the more superficial concerns of the institutions and 
provide a framework for the future, the regions saw the Constitution as a means of gaining 
more power for themselves and the Committee of Regions. Thus, the regions became ac-
tively involved in the 2003 debates surrounding the EU Constitution. As this section shows, 
the regional involvement in the constitutional debates serves as one of the best examples of 
the intersection of liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance. 
During the debates among EU officials over the Constitution, the Committee of Re-
gions (CoR) actively advocated for greater territorial cohesion and a better division of power 
that included the regional governments. Both the Basques and Catalans played a role in mak-
ing recommendations to the Constitutional Convention on these issues (Bourne, 2008). Be-
yond this, the Basques and Catalans took steps independent of the CoR to insert themselves 
into the constitutional debates. The Catalans participated in several “mini” conventions that 
brought together intellectuals, politicians and societal leaders in an effort to gather opinions 
on what the people in the regions wanted in an EU constitution. The Basque government 
took a more unilateral approach and chose to submit statements containing their position on 
a number of issues directly to the Convention (Bourne, 2008). 
The ability of the regions to voice their concerns and assert themselves in the consti-
tutional debates is undeniably a sign of multilevel governance in the EU. Throughout these 
debates, the regions were able to advocate for issues that were salient to them and act within 
an official body that was connected to the EU. However, for the most part, the regions still 
had to bring their policy agendas to the institutions and national governments. Though the 
regions were actively involved in the debates surrounding the EU Constitution, they were 
not involved in the drafting of the document that would be up for referendum (Bourne, 
2008). Furthermore, as Bourne mentions, the Basques and Catalans (and the regions in 
general) were only able to make policy recommendations to the Constitutional Convention. 
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They had little say in what would be the final outcome of the convention. In this example, 
it is clear that the member states (and institutions) wielded a significant amount of control as 
well. Here, the fusion of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism in the EU 
becomes evident. While the regions boasted some influence in the constitutional debates, the 
member states remained at the helm of discussion and policy-making. Thus “governance” 
took the form of a combination of liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance. 
The intersection of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism becomes 
even more evident when one looks toward the Lisbon treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 
2007, has greatly expanded the power of the regions in the EU. Specifically, the principle of 
subsidiarity has provided an opportunity for regional governments to garner greater influ-
ence in the policy-making process. The term, subsidiarity, refers to the idea that decisions 
on policy must be taken as closely to the citizen as possible (“Europa: Summaries of,” 2010). 
This means that as policy decisions come about that can be handled by the regional govern-
ments, the EU has resolved to allow them to take control. The Treaty of Lisbon reinforced 
this principle by introducing a means for the regions to contest a legislative act before the 
Court of Justice, if they feel subsidiarity has been infringed upon (“Europa: Summaries of ”, 
2010). The addition of this power to the Committee of Regions’ repertoire has devolved 
more decision-making power to the regions. However, the Lisbon Treaty also states that only 
through their member states can the regions contest legislative acts (“Europa: Summaries 
of ”, 2010). In this case, power has been devolved to both the national governments and 
regions. Power in the EU is based upon both parties and neither one can claim complete 
control.        
Overall, the discourse surrounding the EU has fundamentally changed. Instead of fo-
cusing on the expansion of policy areas or the inclusion of more member states, the EU is 
also interested in forging relations with regional governments. The ideas of multilevel gov-
ernance and liberal intergovernmentalism analyzed in this paper differ in opinion on what 
governance looks like in the EU, and whether regional governments are capable of support-
ing a direct relationship with the institutions.  
Chapter 3: Results
So far I have offered a history of governance in the EU and have analyzed multilevel 
governance and liberal intergovernmentalism in the context of two cases, the Basque and 
Catalan regions of Spain. Though each is varied in its approach toward the EU the Basque 
and Catalan regions serve as sterling examples of regional participation at the European level. 
These regions were among the first to establish a presence in Brussels and are arguably some 
of the most active regions in the EU. More than this, the Basque and Catalan communities 
are two of the most autonomous regions to date, and serve as excellent examples of regional 
governments interacting with EU officials. For these reasons, I have chosen the Basque and 
Catalan regions as cases that demonstrate the new type of governance and power-sharing 
the EU is facing.
My research question is a simple one, how does liberal intergovernmentalism and mul-
tilevel governance combine to form a means of describing the current nature of governance 
in the EU? In order to evaluate my research question I adopted a two pronged approach in 
which I interviewed EU officials and used public opinion surveys to draw conclusions on 
the state of governance in the institutions. The Basque and Catalan regions serve as cases 
through which I carried out my research methods. Hence, the public opinion surveys and 
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interview questions have all been taken from these regions. I argue that despite the initial fer-
vor surrounding multilevel governance the structure of the EU more closely resembles a sys-
tem in which liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance co-exist. Beyond the 
obvious symbols of multilevel governance, the Committee of Regions (CoR) and regional 
offices, it is undeniable that the member states still wield a significant amount of power. It 
cannot be said that the institutional structure of the EU is one in which neither one of these 
parties (the regions or the member states) completely dominates the other.
Before continuing with this paper I must mention that the research presented here 
comes with a caveat. Though I have taken two of the best examples of regions interacting 
with the EU, the Basques and Catalans, as case studies there may be different results for 
other regions. The public opinion data presented here and interviews conducted were all 
approached with the Basque and Catalan regions in mind. A closer analysis of other regions 
might yield different results as to how the public feels about regional involvement in the EU. 
That being said the research I have included in my thesis is indicative of a wider trend in the 
EU that marries liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance. No matter the case 
study chosen the argument that governance in EU resembles more of a mixture of these two 
arguments is likely to come about. 
The argument I have presented is developed in two parts. Part one analyzes public 
opinion data from the EU. This data is taken from both a country-wide and regional per-
spective, and is used to draw conclusions on how the public sees regionalism in the EU. 
Though the literature presented in previous chapters has revealed laudable efforts to include 
regional entities into the European framework it has exposed little about public opinion on 
the EU. Understanding how the regions themselves perceive their involvement in the EU 
is an important step in concluding that the institutions are more of a mixture of multilevel 
governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. Part two addresses the results from interviews 
with three officials who have all witnessed first-hand governance structures in the EU. This 
chapter concludes with a look ahead at how the results generated from my research offer 
insight into the future of the EU.
Public Opinion on EU Participation
Public opinion data provides governing bodies with a means to assess how the people 
in their territory feel about certain issues. For the EU, public opinion data is especially 
important. The power of the EU stretches across an entire continent and affects millions of 
people. Thus, it is vital for the EU to have a means of analyzing how the public feels about 
its structure and policy decisions. Perhaps the best way public opinion on the EU can be 
assessed is with Eurobarometer Surveys and results from EU referenda. In this section, I use 
both of these tools to analyze the current nature of governance in the EU.
Before analyzing the opinion data taken from the Eurobarometer Surveys, it is impor-
tant to look back and understand how public sentiment for the EU has developed over the 
years. Doing so provides context to the data presented later in this paper. It would be difficult 
to comprehend the change in public sentiment without first analyzing how the regions felt 
during the early years of regionalism in the EU.  Table 1 includes data from a 2002 survey 
conducted in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Participants in this survey were asked 
about their confidence and trust in the three level of government that affect their lives, the 
regional leaders, the national government and the EU. 
If a ranking of five is taken as the threshold for confidence, we see that much of the 
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population in both the Basque and Catalan regions had support for the EU in the early 
2000s. This is unsurprising given that just a few years earlier the EU made attempts to offer 
these regions a means of influencing the institutions and a place on the European stage. For 
many people, as evident by this survey, support for the EU was almost equal to that of their 
regional government. However, the data presented in the rest of this chapter shows that once 
the fervor of regionalism dies down and the regions become increasingly disappointed by 
the amount of power they actually possess support for the EU decreases. 
Table 1. On a scale of 0 to 10 how much confidence do you have in each of 
these institutions, with 0 meaning ‘no confidence’ and 10 ‘total confidence’?
No Con-
fidence





1.0 0.3 1.5 2.4 4.2 15.7 16.3 19.9 23.3 7.4 6.2
Central Gov-
ernment
10.5 1.2 4.6 11.4 14.2 25.5 14.6 7.0 6.0 1.3 0.6
European 
Union




4.7 0.8 3.0 3.3 8.0 29.0 15.8 13.7 11.1 3.3 4.2
Central Gov-
ernment
12.6 2.5 5.5 8.7 12.3 28.5 10.6 6.9 5.5 1.7 2.4
European 
Union
6.8 1.3 3.8 5.9 7.9 30.2 13.9 9.7 7.5 0.9 1.4
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2002). 
Notes: Numbers shown are in percentages.
In 2005, the Spanish people became the first Europeans to vote on the text of the 
EU Constitution. Though this referendum was meant to simply gauge public opinion on 
the constitution, it revealed startling information on regional approval of the EU. Overall, 
the Spanish public voted in favor of the EU Constitution (see Table 2). Both the media and 
political elites in Spain dubbed the results of the referendum a clear yes and stated that the 
Spanish people had helped to move the rest of Europe forward (“Spain Voters” 2005). How-
ever, within the Basque and Catalan regions support for the referendum varied.
Table 2. Results from the EU Constitution Referendum in Spain
Yes (in favor of the constitu-
tion)
No (not in favor of the consti-
tution)
Spain (overall) 76.72 % 23.28 %
Basque Region 66.34 % 33.66 %
Catalan Region 71.93 % 28.07 %
Source: Eurobarometer 168, European Commission (2005)
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As Table 2 shows, the no vote in the Basque and Catalan regions was a bit higher than 
that of the Spanish state overall. In fact, of all the autonomous communities in Spain the 
Basque and Catalan regions had the highest percentage of no votes (Flash Eurobarometer 
168, 2005). It is undeniable that in both regions the majority of the populace voted in 
favor of the constitution. In the midst of the fervor surrounding multilevel governance, 
the Basques and Catalans believed that the EU would be a means for them to bypass their 
national government and exert some influence on the international stage. Support for the 
EU in these regions soared as the local authorities professed their faith in the EU’s regional 
policies (Elias, 2008). However, the percentage of no votes suggests that in these regions faith 
in the EU is waning. 
The results of Flash Eurobarometer 168 serve as an additional marker that there is a 
decrease in regional support for the EU’s initiatives. In Figure 1, participants in Eurobarom-
eter 168 were asked to identify which party they affiliated themselves with and how they 
voted in the referendum. The vast majority of participants that affiliated themselves with 
either the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) or EA (Eusko Alkartasuna) voted against the 
EU Constitution. In that same vein, Catalonian affiliates of the ERC (Republican Left of 
Catalonia) voted a resounding ‘no’ against the constitution. The results are surprising given 
that in the past the Basque and Catalan regions have been some of the biggest supporters of 
EU initiatives (Elias, 2008). Overall, the no votes suggest that the regions are not in favor of 
more integration in the form of an overarching constitution. They also leave the reader to 
question the role of cueing in the weeks leading up to the referendum. When voters have 
limited knowledge of a policy or issue area political parties can provide ‘cues’ delineating 
what is at stake and how the public should cast its vote. As Ben Crum writes, center-left 
and center-right parties tend to be more supportive of the EU. Outright rejection of EU 
policies is typically restricted to the far ends of the left-right party spectrum (Crum, 2007). 
A party’s placement on this spectrum can have a considerable impact on how it uses cueing. 
The outcome of the EU Constitution referendum is a testament to how much of an impact 
cueing can have on the voter.
In Spain, the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) and CiU (Convergence and Union) 
both joined the PSOE, the party in power at the national level, in supporting the EU Con-
stitution (Crum, 2007). Similarly, the ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia) and EA (Eusko 
Alkartasuna) used cueing to generate support for a no vote in their regions. With cueing 
having a large role in the campaign for the EU Constitution, it is unsurprising that many 
supporters of the PNV and CiU parties voted yes in the referendum while most affiliates of 
the ERC and EA parties voted no (see Figure 1). Despite the obvious impact of cueing on 
the outcome of the referendum, the results show that the regions are not as supportive of EU 
initiatives as they once were. The notion of political party cueing and its ability to serve as an 
indication that the liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance are interrelated 
is revisited at the end of this paper.
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Figure 1. Results from Flash Eurobarometer168
Source: European Commission (2005)
The slight decrease in support for EU initiatives, as evident by the number of ‘no’ votes 
coming from the Basque and Catalan regions, is indicative of the type of governance cur-
rently seen in the EU. As previously mentioned, the local authorities viewed the initiatives 
of the EU as a sign that the hour of the regions had arrived. However, the regions were not 
completely satisfied with the capacities extended to them. The decrease in regional support 
shows that the EU has not become a body in which the regions have an equal amount of 
power. Yes, they have an influence in what kinds of policy the EU pursues but the regions 
are not equal to the member states or institutions. The regions and member states both have 
influence and power, but the position of the member states in the EU may be a little higher 
than that of the regions. The situation described here is part of the reason why support for 
EU initiatives in the regions has experienced a slight decrease. If the regions felt they were 
equal partners in the EU, support may not have fallen. It is clear that the EU has a developed 
a system in which the principles of multilevel governance are combined with those of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
Those who believe that liberal intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance are 
mutually exclusive might counter that the constitutional referendum and subsequent Eu-
robarometer took place in 2005. They might argue that those results cannot possibly be 
characteristic of the EU we see today. Indeed, the EU has changed since Eurobarometer 168 
was conducted. However, the opinions of the general population in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country and many autonomous regions across Europe have not. Eurobarometer 307 and 
356 corroborate the idea that regional populations remain skeptical of the EU’s commitment 
to the regions. The disappointment of local authorities with the extent of regionalism in the 
institutions provides evidence that multilevel governance cannot solely be used to describe 
the EU. 
Eurobarometer 307, commissioned in 2008, seeks to evaluate how citizens view various 
levels of public authority in Europe. Specifically, this Eurobarometer asks participants to state 
their level of knowledge of the Committee of Regions (CoR) and their trust in local, na-
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tional, and EU institutions. Though the data from Eurobarometer 307 is not categorized on 
a regional basis, important observations can be made about support for the EU verses sup-
port for regional governments in Spain. As the following tables show, awareness of regional 
presence in the EU and satisfaction with the EU’s treatment of the regions is not very high 
in Spain. This sentiment is reflective of the opinions of the larger EU member-state network.
Table 3. In your opinion, which of the different levels of public authorities (Eu-
ropean level, national level, regional or local level) has the most impact on your 
life conditions?
Spain EU 27
European Level 9 % 9 %
National Level 39 % 43 %
Regional or Local Level 42 % 38 %
Don’t Know 10 % 10 %
Source: Eurobarometer 307, European Commission (2009)
Table 4. In your opinion, are regional or local public authorities sufficiently or 
not taken into account when deciding policies in the European Union?
Spain EU 27
Sufficiently 21 % 19 %
Not Sufficiently 50 % 59 %
Don’t Know 29 % 22 %
Source: Eurobarometer 307, European Commission (2009)
Table 5. The Committee of the Regions of the EU represents the point of view of 
regional and local public authorities of all Member-States when deciding policies 
in the EU. Before this interview, did you know that?
Spain EU 27
Yes and you were very familiar with it 5 % 4 %
Yes, but you were not really familiar with it 18 % 20 %
No, not at all 38 % 52 %
Never heard about the CoR 35 % 18 %
Don’t Know 4 % 6 %
Source: Eurobarometer 307, European Commission (2009)
In evaluating the results from Eurobarometer 307, it becomes clear that there are large 
discrepancies between whom regional populations feel have a greater impact on their lives 
and who is receiving the most recognition at the EU level. As Table 3 shows, a large percent-
age of the population in both Spain and the EU as a whole feel that their local/regional 
governments have the most impact on their daily lives. However, Table 4 shows that for many 
people regional authorities are not sufficiently recognized at the EU level. As the closest level 
of governance to the people, regional authorities should be recognized in the EU, and for 
the most part they are. However, the data shows that many people are not satisfied with how 
their regional governments are being represented at the EU level. In fact, a vast majority of 
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the population does not know what regional bodies like the Committee of Regions do or 
that they exist (see Table 5)! 
Eurobarometer 356 provides further evidence of the disappointment people in the 
regions feel towards regionalism in the EU. This Eurobarometer, the first to collect data on 
a regional basis, asks questions similar to those posed in Eurobarometer 307. It is useful in 
that it offers further insight into the public’s opinion on the role of the regions in the EU. 
In particular, the following question from Eurobarometer 356 is pertinent to my analysis.
Table 6. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in the 
European Union. Could you please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to 
trust it?
Basque Region Catalonia
Tend to trust 36 % 38 %
Tend not to trust 60 % 57 %
Don’t Know 4 % 5 %
Source: Eurobarometer  356, European Commission (2012)
Table 6 shows that mistrust of the EU is greater once opinions are taken at the regional 
level. In the past, the regions have expressed goals of gaining greater influence at the Euro-
pean level. Mistrust of the EU is high because the regions feel that they have not been able 
to reach this goal, despite the fact that opportunities for regional involvement do exist. All of 
the aforementioned public sentiment points toward a system in which multilevel governance 
is not the only means of describing governance in the EU.
The tables and figures presented above provides evidence that overall the public is 
disappointed with the extent to which regionalism has been pursued in the EU. In the late 
1980s and 1990s, many believed that the hour of the regions had finally arrived and that 
the regional entities would have a viable say in the inner-workings of the EU. Though the 
regions have gained a significant amount of influence in the EU, they do not feel as if they 
are on equal footing with the member states and institutions. The member states, especially, 
still have a large amount of control in the organizational structure of the EU. It is the mem-
ber states who are represented in the Council of the EU, one of the three main institutions 
involved in EU legislation. The Committee of Regions exists outside of this triangle of 
decision-making. Thus the proponents of multilevel governance and liberal intergovern-
mentalism are both correct. Hooghe and Marks argue that instead of power being concen-
trated within the member states and institutions power is now shared across all territorial 
levels. Andrew Moravcsik and liberal intergovernmentalists argue that it is the member states 
who are the main actors in EU integration. The previous discussion of public opinion in 
the regions demonstrates that there are aspects of both of these arguments in the EU. While 
the regions are influential the member states possess a type of power that has not yet been 
given to the local authorities. This realization shows that governance in the EU most closely 
resembles a mixture of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Party Cueing and Support for the EU
Before continuing to a discussion of how EU officials view governance and regional-
ism, it is important to return to the notion of political party cueing. Throughout this paper, 
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I have presented data that shows regional publics (both in the Basque and Catalan regions 
and greater Europe) have become disappointed with the scope of regionalism in the EU. 
Though the general public is capable of making judgments on its own, people rely on cues as 
short-cuts. As previously stated, cueing refers to a signal that tells voters what is at stake in an 
issue and how they should vote on said issue. In the context of my discussion of the current 
nature of governance in the EU, understanding the extent to which the public is subject to 
cues from political leaders illuminates whether or not regional support for the EU, especially 
in the Basque and Catalan regions, is decreasing as much as it appears to be. 
The Basque and Catalan regions are two of seventeen autonomous communities in 
Spain. Such decentralization has created a state in which the regional governments have 
more access to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people in their community. Minority national-
ist parties in both of these regions have taken advantage of their proximity to the general 
population by cueing for certain policies and initiatives. In the 1980s and 1990s, Basque and 
Catalonian regional parties felt as if they had more to gain than to lose within Europe (Elias, 
2008). Thus they threw their support behind the EU, and most likely used cues to convince 
the general public to do the same. When the regions began to feel that the power they had 
hoped to gain from the EU was not being given to them, their support for the EU waned 
(Elias, 2008). 
Figure 2. Identity in Catalonia
Source: Martinez-Herrera (2002)
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Figure 3. Identity in the Basque Country
Source: Martinez-Herrera (2002)
The decrease in elite (meaning regional party) support for the EU certainly affected 
how the public would view the EU. The Basques and Catalans are more attached to their 
regions because they reside within those autonomous communities. Figures 2 and 3 show 
that the percentage of people in the Basque and Catalan regions who identify as ‘more Span-
ish’ has decreased. At the same time, the number of people who identify as ‘more regional’ or 
being both Spanish and regional has grown (Martìnez-Herrera, 2002). It is no wonder then 
that the cueing of political parties in these regions can affect how people vote and perceive 
the EU. If parties within those regions cue for a ‘no’ on referendums or negatively portray 
the EU, the people in those regions are likely to follow their lead. The lack of faith in the EU 
on the part of regional political elites has led to decreased support in the Basque Country 
and Catalonia.
EU Officials and Governance
The second part of my research methodology consists of interviews with officials on 
the best way to describe governance in the EU and regional participation. Risto Raivio, 
former employee in the Directorate for Consultative work in the Committee of Regions, 
made a clear point of saying that as of late regional governments have recognized that the 
EU is a new framework for them to work in. Mr. Raivio stated that in the late nineties and 
early part of the millennium, there was widespread belief that a lasting partnership would be 
forged between the commission and regions on implementing policies. Despite the initial 
optimism for multilevel governance in the EU, it has become clear that the vast capabilities 
the regions were hoping to receive did not come about. As Mr. Raivio states, “the center of 
power in the EU remains concentrated within the Council, Commission and Parliament” 
(Raivo). Thus there is little room for other groups, namely the regions, to exert influence in 
the EU unless room is made for them.
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Pedro Cervilla, a Director of Registry and Legal Service in the Committee of Regions, 
expressed a more optimistic view of the current state of relations between the EU and re-
gions. He maintains that the CoR is the only source for representation for the regions in 
the EU, that it serves as a public lobby for the citizens of Europe, and that it should have 
a larger role in the institutions. Moreover, he argues, “The Committee of Regions does 
have influence, though less than it could be. The CoR has the power to give opinions to 
the Council on legislative issues. Furthermore, the body has the possibility of going to the 
Court of Justice if the principle of subsidiarity has been infringed upon” (Cervilla). In these 
two responses alone, it is clear that there is a difference of opinion on both the role of the 
regions and the state of regionalism in the EU. This disagreement on the role of the regions 
is precisely why governance is best described as mixture of liberal intergovernmentalism and 
multilevel governance. The arguments and examples provided by Mr. Raivio and Mr. Cervila 
shows that there are traces of both of these principles in the EU we see today. 
Steen Illeborg, the former director of the Committee of Regions, was also optimistic 
about organizations like the CoR and stated that the process of regional integration into the 
EU has thus far been a success. He argues that the presence of the EU has allowed strong 
regions like Catalonia to engage in more talks for independence. In regards to the regional 
offices, Mr. Illeborg states that, “Given the present state of the economy if they weren’t useful 
and didn’t serve a purpose they would most certainly be speedily closed. At the same time 
the presence of these offices in Brussels and all their promotional activities efficiently adds to 
the knowledge of regions in the EU system and thus to the regional profile in the EU” (Il-
leborg). Mr. Illeborg’s statement offers another facet to this discussion on governance in the 
EU. According to him, greater regional participation offers a chance for the EU to expand 
its knowledge of the populace in Europe and generate partners in the policy-making process. 
However, the EU must find a way to expand the powers given to the regions without drasti-
cally changing the existing balance of power. As has been discussed throughout this paper, 
the members still have the upper hand over the regions. Since regional participation still lies 
under the auspices of the national government it can be curbed at any point. For example, 
the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty included a provision for sub-state actors to participate 
in the Council of Ministers. However, the Spanish government has yet to allow the Basques 
and Catalans, or any regional group in its borders for that matter, to take advantage of the 
Council of Ministers’ offer (Roller, 2004). Given this, it is imperative that the EU find a way 
to negotiate control and delegate powers for both parties. Otherwise cooperation within the 
EU and policy implementation could be at risk. 
The interviews conducted with EU officials have revealed a crucial point in the multi-
level governance vs. liberal intergovernmentalism debate. All of the officials interviewed have 
provided examples of regional participation in the EU as well as member state control. Steen 
Illeborg identified the Committee of Regions and regional offices as the centers of regional 
influence in the EU institutional structure. Pedro Cervilla cited all of the new competencies 
given to the regions by the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, Risto Ravio mentioned that though the 
regions do wield some influence in the EU, the main locus of power is centered within the 
Commission, Council and Parliament. Given these examples, we see that both the regions 
and the member states have avenues for influence in the institutions. Scholars who side with 
either multilevel governance or liberal intergovernmentalism are both correct. The argu-
ments brought forth by these dueling theories are interconnected and together they describe 
governance in the EU.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Years after the emergence of local actors onto the European stage, the debate over the 
role of the regions in the EU rages on. As has been stated throughout this paper, the debate 
has largely converged around two camps: those who believe that the regions have a vital role 
in the EU and those who believe it is the member states that hold all of the power. In the 
course of this paper, I have argued that neither theory alone is an adequate means of describ-
ing the current structure of the EU. A final conclusion on the role of the regions in the EU 
is far off, but it can be said that governance in the EU as of late most closely resembles a 
mixture of multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Political elites within the regions view participation in the EU as a means of having 
their concerns voiced on the international stage. This view is most evident in the two cases I 
selected for my paper, the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain. Both the Basque and Cata-
lan governments have made strides to interact with the EU and expand their capacities at 
the European level. Through active participation in the EU’s most visible regional body, The 
Committee of Regions, and the formation of regional offices the Basques and Catalans have 
established a name for themselves in Brussels. These cases have demonstrated that there is 
room for regional participation in the EU and that the officials in Brussels are largely open 
to greater regional involvement. At the same time, the member states have proven to be in-
fluential forces in the EU and have a firm grasp of power in the institutions.
Though EU involvement has been embraced by political elites in the regions, there is 
evidence to suggest that both the general public and regional governments are feeling disap-
pointed by the degree of power extended to them. As my analysis of Eurobarometers 307 
and 356 showed, the populations in the Basque and Catalan regions are not very trusting of 
the EU. In addition, many believe there is a large gap between the salience of the regions in 
the lives of the people and the extent to which the public feels those regions are represented 
in the EU. More than this, the recent financial crisis has drawn the public’s attention back to 
the domestic level. People in the Basque and Catalan regions, and regions outside of Spain, 
are more focused on ending the financial crisis then they are in pursuing Europe. That is not 
to say that the EU is no longer important to the regions, simply that it is less of a priority. 
Finally, it has yet to be seen whether the member states are fully willing to share power 
with another entity in the EU. As it stands, the member states already share power with the 
EU institutions. Will member states be willing to share power with regional actors as well? 
The answer to this question is vital to the expansion of powers for the regions and is unfor-
tunately beyond the scope of this paper. Until the member states agree, it will be difficult for 
the regions to exert greater influence on the EU. 
Throughout the 1990s and at the turn of the millennium many scholars, particularly 
Hooghe and Marks, proclaimed that the hour of the regions had come. However, more than 
10 years later, the regions remain in largely the same positions they were when Hooghe and 
Marks wrote their piece on multilevel governance. The locus of real decision-making power 
still resides within the Commission, Council and Parliament of the EU. Undeniably, there are 
instances of both regional and member state influence in the policy proposals of the institu-
tions. Governance in the EU has been shown to be a mixture of multilevel governance and 
liberal intergovernmentalism. As previously stated, a final resolution to this debate is far off, 
but this paper has offered some insight into the current state of relations between the EU 
and the regions. This information can now be used to understand where regionalism in the 
EU is headed and to devise a plan for how the EU can get there. 
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